We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.
I. Introduction.
In this paper, we examine securities laws of 49 countries, focusing specifically on how these laws regulate the issuance of new equity to the public. Security issuance is subject to the wellknown Apromoter=s problem@ (Mahoney 1995) B the risk that corporate issuers sell bad securities to the public B and as such is covered in all securities laws. 1 We analyze the specific provisions in securities laws governing initial public offerings in each country, examine the relationship between these provisions and various measures of stock market development, and interpret the evidence in light of the available theories of securities laws.
1 Teoh et al. (1998) and Dechow et al. (1996) present evidence consistent with the view that US firms manipulate accounting figures to raise capital on favorable terms. Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings= manipulation is more extensive in countries with weak investor protection.
For securities markets, alternative theories of optimal legal arrangements can be distilled down to three broad hypotheses. Under the null hypothesis, associated with Coase (1960) and Stigler (1964) , the optimal government policy is to do nothing. Issuers of securities have an incentive to disclose all available information to obtain higher prices simply because failure to disclose would cause investors to assume the worst (Grossman 1981 , Grossman and Hart 1980 , Milgrom and Roberts 1986 . Investors can rely on these disclosures when there are reputational, legal and contractual penalties for misreporting, verification of accuracy is costless, or reporting accuracy is backed by warranties. When verification is costly, issuers of Agood@ securities can resort to additional mechanisms to signal their quality (Ross 1979) . For example, auditors and underwriters can credibly certify the quality of the securities being offered to safeguard their reputation and avoid liability under contract or tort law (Benston 1985 , Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994 , De Long 1991 .
Similarly, private stock exchanges can mandate optimal disclosure and monitor compliance by listed firms to facilitate trading (Benston 1973 , Fischel and Grossman 1984 , Miller 1991 . These market and general legal mechanisms suffice for securities markets to prosper. Securities law is either irrelevant (to the extent that it codifies existing market arrangements or can be contracted around), or damaging, in so far as it raises contracting costs and invites political interference in markets (Coase 1975 , Macey 1994 , Romano 2001 .
The two alternative hypotheses hold that Alaw matters.@ Reputations, contract, and tort law are insufficient to keep promoters from cheating investors because the payoff from cheating is too high and because private tort and contract litigation is too expensive and unpredictable to serve as a deterrent. To reduce the enforcement costs and opportunistic behavior, the government can introduce a securities law specifying the contracting framework. 2 The two alternative hypotheses differ in what kind of government intervention such a framework would optimally call for.
Under the first alternative, the government can standardize the private contracting framework to improve market discipline and private litigation. Without such standardization, litigation is governed by contract and tort law, with grave uncertainty about outcomes because such matters as intent and negligence need to be sorted out in court (Easterbrook and Fischel 1984) . We examine two aspects of standardization. First, the law can mandate disclosure of particular information, such as profitability and ownership structure, in the prospectus. Such mandates if followed make it easier for investors to value companies and therefore more willing to invest, and if violated create a prima facie liability of issuers or intermediaries. Second, the law can specify the liability standards facing issuers and intermediaries when investors seek to recover damages from companies that 4 follow affirmative disclosure rules but fail to reveal potentially material information. By doing so, the law can reduce the uncertainties and the costs of private litigation, benefiting markets.
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Under the final hypothesis, even with a securities law describing the disclosure obligations of various parties and liability standards, private enforcement incentives are often insufficient to elicit honesty from issuers. A public enforcer, such as a Securities and Exchange Commission, is needed to support trade. Such an enforcer might be able to intervene ex ante, by clarifying legal obligations, or ex post, by imposing its own penalties or bringing lawsuits. Public enforcement might work because the enforcer is independent and focused and so can regulate markets free from political interference, because the enforcer can introduce regulations of market participants, because it can secure information from issuers and market participants B through subpoena, discovery, or other means B more effectively than private plaintiffs, or because it can impose sanctions. 4 Under this hypothesis, the strength of public enforcement introduced by securities laws is most beneficial for market development.
To distinguish these hypotheses, we cooperated with attorneys from 49 countries to assemble a data base of rules and regulations governing security issuance. We use the data to produce quantitative measures of securities laws and regulations, with a focus on mandatory disclosure, liability standards, and public enforcement. Finally, we examine the relationship between our measures of securities laws and a number of indicators of stock market development. In the analysis below, we first motivate our data collection effort using an example of an actual dispute, then Fox (1999) , Stulz (1999) , Black (2001) , Beny (2002) , and Reese and Weisbach (2002) .
7 ago, did not have a clearly defined responsibilities and automatic penalties for issuers and underwriters as required by Grossman and Hart (1980) . Some of the differences between the example and their model are worth emphasizing. First, reputational concerns did not suffice to induce the issuer to disclose the omitted information or the underwriter to carry out an independent investigation of the issuer=s financial condition. Second, the problem for private enforcement was not that of inaccurate disclosure --in fact the issuer complied with the affirmative disclosure requirements, but rather the omission of material information from the prospectus. This omission did not cause investors to assume the worst; after all, they bought the bonds. Third, this omission raised the question for the court of whether the distributor or the issuer was liable, with the distributor rather than the bankrupt issuer having the assets to compensate investors. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the court had to resolve the crucial question of the standard of liability for the distributor, namely what were its affirmative obligations to investors. The court did not presume, as in the model, that failure to disclose automatically caused liability. Resolving this issue required extensive, and expensive, litigation, leading to a particular standard of care. These differences between the case and the model suggest that in reality, enforcement of good conduct is costly, and hence we should not necessarily expect efficient outcomes from unregulated markets.
This enforcement-based reasoning forms the analytical foundation of the case for securities laws. Market mechanisms and litigation supporting private contracting may be too expensive. Since investors, on average, are not tricked (this is not an issue of market efficiency), they pay lower prices for the equity when they are unprotected, and the amount of equity issued is lower (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002, La Porta et al. 2002) . Securities laws, in so far as they reduce the cost of contracting and resolving disputes, can encourage equity financing of firms and stock market 8 development. The Dutch example also suggests that solving the promoter=s problem is important not only for equity markets but for debt markets as well.
The Variables.
Our data on the regulation of the promoter=s problem is based on answers to a questionnaire by attorneys in the sample of 49 countries with the largest stock market capitalization in 1993 (La Porta et al. 1998) . We invited one attorney from each country to answer the questionnaire describing the securities laws (including actual laws, statues, regulations, binding judicial precedents, and any other rule with force of law) applicable to an offering of shares listed in the country=s largest stock exchange in December of 2000.
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All 49 authors returned answered questionnaires, and subsequently confirmed the validity of their answers as we recorded them. All the variables derived from the questionnaires and other sources are defined in Table I .
Disclosure and Liability Standards
As James Landis, the principal author of U.S. securities laws, recognized, making private recovery of investors= losses easy was essential to harnessing the incentives of market participants to enforce securities laws (Landis 1938 , Seligman, 1995 . Efficiency considerations suggest that the lowest cost provider of information about a security should collect and present this information, and be held accountable if he omits or misleads. In the Grossman-Hart model (1980) , for example, the 5 We first approached authors who had published country reports on securities laws in publications such as
International Securities Regulation and International Securities Laws. When countries were not covered in such publications or authors declined our invitation, we searched the Martindale Law Directory to identify leading law firms practicing in the area of securities laws and invited them to answer the questionnaire. The respondents received a questionnaire designed by the authors with the help of practicing lawyers in Argentina, Japan, and the United States.
lowest cost providers are not the investors, but the issuers, the distributors, and the accountants. 6 An efficient system would provide them with incentives to collect and present information to investors, and hold them liable if they do not. In securities laws, this strategy generally takes the form of disclosure requirements and liability standards that make it cheaper for investors to recover damages when information is wrong or omitted --the two features we try to capture empirically.
We collect six proxies for the strength of specific disclosure requirements pertaining to the promoter=s problem. 7 The first and most basic question is whether promoters can issue securities without delivering a prospectus describing them to potential investors in advance. Since every country requires a prospectus before securities are sold and listed, the operational word here is
Adelivering.@ In some countries, it is possible to sell securities after a prospectus is deposited at the company, or with the Supervisor, without delivering it to investors. Delivering a prospectus to potential investors is an affirmative step in making disclosures to them. In addition, we keep track of affirmative disclosure requirement in the following five areas: (1) insiders= compensation; (2) ownership by large shareholders; (3) inside ownership; (4) contracts outside the normal course of business; and (5) transactions with related parties. We calculate the index of Adisclosure requirements@ as the average of the preceding six proxies.
In addition to specific disclosure requirements, nearly every country has a residual disclosure 6 Two other features of initial public offerings make Abuyer-beware@ rules unattractive. First, the scope for fraud is very large. Second, the damages resulting from investing in reliance of a defective prospectus are much easier to calculate than those that result from, for example, the use of a defective appliance.
7 A detailed study of the impact of substantive disclosure rules is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we have examined the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of less selective measures of disclosure. Bushman et al. (2003) present data on firm's actual disclosure in the following four areas: (1) segments, R&D, capital expenditures, accounting policies, subsidiaries; (2) major shareholders, management, board, director and officer remuneration, director and officer shareholding; (3) consolidation, discretionary reserves; and (4) frequency of reporting, consolidation of interim reports, number of disclosed items. None of these variables has additional explanatory power in our regressions.
requirement that the prospectus must include all material information necessary to assess the value of the securities being offered. When bad news hit after security issuance, the question becomes whether this information was known or knowable to the issuer, the distributor, and/or the accountant and omitted from the prospectus. As legal scholars including Black (2001) and Coffee (2002) emphasize, and as the Dutch example illustrates, the liability standard in the cases of such omission is central to private enforcement of securities laws.
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There are basically four liability standards. In the Abase@ case, the standard is the same as in torts, namely negligence: the plaintiff must show that the issuer, the distributor, or the accountant was negligent in omitting information from the prospectus. The tort standard also requires that investors prove that they relied on the prospectus to invest (reliance) or that their losses were caused by the misleading information in the prospectus (causality). Some countries rule out recovery in a prospectus liability case or make it harder than the tort standard by requiring the plaintiffs to show that the defendants either knew about the omission or acted with intent or gross negligence (e.g., while Adrunk@) in omitting the information from the prospectus. In contrast, the burden of proof is less demanding than tort in countries where investors must prove reliance or causality or both, but not negligence. Finally, burden of the proof is lowest where plaintiffs only need to show that the information in the prospectus was misleading (but not reliance or causality). The defendants are either strictly liable (i.e., they cannot avoid liability if the prospectus omitted information), or they must themselves show that they exercised due diligence in preparing the prospectus. This shift in 8 We have been asked to examine whether the availability of class action suits and contingency fees are associated with the development of securities markets. A dummy equal to one if class actions are available in a prospectus liability case is an insignificant predictor of the development of securities markets. Similarly, a dummy equal to one if contingency fees are generally available is an insignificant predictor of the development of securities markets. Finally, the interaction of class actions and contingency fees is also insignificant.
the burden of proof from plaintiffs to defendants can, in principle, significantly reduce the cost to the former of establishing liability.
In our empirical analysis, we distinguish these four liability standards in cases against issuers and directors, distributors, and accountants and compute a Aliability standard@ index.
Public Enforcement
In the context of a securities markets, a public enforcer can be a Securities Commission, a
Central Bank, or some other supervisory body. For concreteness, we call the main government agency or official authority in charge of supervising securities markets the Supervisor. We focus on five broad aspects of public enforcement.
The first aspect covers the basic attributes of the Supervisor, which we capture with three variables. First, an effective Supervisor may need to be insulated from interference by the Executive both to facilitate recruiting professional staff and to prevent political interference on behalf of influential issuers. To measure the Supervisor=s independence, we keep track of whether its key members are appointed through a system of checks-and-balances or unilaterally by the Executive.
Second, the independence of the Supervisor may be enhanced when its key members may only be dismissed after due process rather than at the will of the appointing authority. Third, an effective
Supervisor may need to be focused on securities markets, rather than on both these markets and banking, so that his success is more closely tied to that of the securities market. Accordingly, we measure whether the Supervisor=s mandate covers securities markets alone. We combine these three variables into a sub-index of ASupervisor attributes@.
The second issue is whether the power to regulate securities markets be delegated to the 
Other Variables
We are interested in understanding the effects of the various provisions in securities laws on financial development. We use seven proxies for the development of securities markets in different countries. The first variable is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP scaled by the fraction that ownership concentration is lower in countries with better investor protection. Finally, the seventh variable is a proxy for stock market liquidity, as measured by the ratio of traded volume to GDP. Levine and Zervos (1998) show that this variable predicts the growth in per capita income.
To isolate the effect of securities laws on financial markets, we control for several factors identified by previous research. The first of these is the level of economic development, which we measure as the (logarithm of) per capita GDP. Economic development is often associated with capital deepening. In addition, richer countries might have higher quality institutions in general, including better property rights and rule of law, which could be associated with better financial development regardless of the content of the laws (North 1981 , La Porta et al. 1999 . 9 To further address this issue, we use the measure of the efficiency of the judiciary from the International Country Risk Guide as an additional control.
La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 present evidence that measures of investor protection derived from corporate law are associated with stock market development. This evidence raises the question of which laws, if any, make a difference. Accordingly, in all our regressions, we include the antidirectors rights index of the protection afforded to shareholders through statutory corporate law as an 9 In practice, per capita GDP is very highly correlated with survey measures of the quality of institutions such as perceptions of property rights, rule of law, and the prevalence of corruption. In our sample, the pair-wise correlation of (log) per capita GDP with property rights, corruption, and rule of law is 0.754, 0.882 and 0.892, respectively. The results reported in the paper are robust to replacing log per capita GDP by any of these three measures.
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additional control.
As in many other studies in this area, the causal effect of securities laws on financial development cannot be established with certainty. Following La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 , we use the legal origin of commercial laws as an instrument. The commercial laws of most countries originate in one of four legal families: English (common) law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian law, which have spread throughout the world through conquest, colonization, and occasionally voluntary transplantation. England developed a common law tradition, characterized by independent judges and juries, relatively weaker reliance on statutes, and the preference for contracts and private litigation as a means of dealing with social harms. France, in contrast, developed a civil law tradition, characterized by state-employed judges, great reliance on legal and procedural codes, and a preference for state regulation over private litigation. This makes legal origin a suitable instrument for the stance of the law regarding alternative regulatory strategies.
Table II presents our data on securities laws. Countries are arranged by legal origin, and we report means by legal origin as well as tests of the differences in these means. There is large crosscountry variation in our measures of securities laws. Common and civil law countries differ significantly in our measures of disclosure, liability standards, and public enforcement. Common law countries both have more extensive mandatory disclosure requirements, and make it easier for investors to recover damages. In the public enforcement area, these differences are smaller for Supervisor attributes and rule-making power, and greater for investigative powers, orders, and criminal sanctions. In the next section, we examine which aspects of the securities, as well as corporate, law matter for financial development. GDP and efficiency of the judiciary tend to be associated with more developed stock markets, and these effects are quantitatively large. To interpret the results on Table III , note that when securities laws are excluded from the regression, stronger anti-director rights are associated with better stock market development for all dependent variables except the index of access to equity (results not reported). In contrast, anti-director rights is only significant in one of the regressions which control for disclosure (ownership concentration) and two of the regressions which control for liability standards (ownership concentration and block premium). The results for anti-director rights are more consistent in the regressions that control for public enforcement. In those regressions, antidirector rights has predictive power for market capitalization, number of firms, block premium, and ownership concentration.
IV. Securities laws and financial development.
Perhaps most interestingly, both disclosure requirements and liability standards are positively correlated with larger stock markets. In Panel A, disclosure is associated with more developed stock markets for all seven dependent variables. The estimated coefficients predict that a two-standard deviation increase in disclosure (roughly the distance from Netherlands to the U.S.) is associated with an increase of 0.27 in the external-market-to-GDP ratio, a 52% rise in listed firms per capita, a 2.22 increase in the IPO-to-GDP ratio, a 13 percentage point drop in the block premium, a 0.85 point improvement in the access-to-equity index, a 9 percentage point drop in ownership concentration, and a 45.9 points increase in the volume-to-GDP ratio.
The results on liability standards are also consistently strong. The estimated coefficients predict that a two-standard deviation increase in this variable (roughly the distance from Denmark to the U.S.) is associated with an increase of 0.23 percentage points in the external-market-to-GDP ratio, a 28% rise in listed firms per capita, a 1.88 increase in the IPO-to-GDP ratio, a 6.6 percentage point drop in the block premium, a 0.75 point improvement in the access-to-equity index, a decrease of 6.6 percentage point drop in ownership concentration (but with a t-stat of only 1.58), and a 45.8
points increase in the volume-to-GDP ratio.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the impact on the external-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio of disclosure and liability standards, respectively. In our sample, the external-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio ranges from 0.002 in Uruguay to 1.44 in Switzerland. Thus, the roughly 0.25 point increase in the external-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio associated with a two-standard deviation improvement in either disclosure or liability standard is economically large. Note also that the strength of disclosure and liability standards is not driven by outliers; we obtain qualitatively similar results using median regressions.
The results for public enforcement (Panel C) are less consistent. Public enforcement only matters for the external-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio and IPOs, although it has a large economic effect on both variables (see Figure 3) . A two-standard deviation increase in public enforcement (roughly from Netherlands to the U.S.) is associated with an increment of 0.15 points in the external-market-capitalization-to-GDP and adds 1.6 firms in the IPO-to-GDP ratio. In contrast,
anti-director rights, but not public enforcement, matters for the number of firms, block premium, and 18 ownership concentration.
These results suggest a preliminary view of what works, and what does not, in securities laws. Public enforcement plays, at best, a modest role in the development of stock markets. In contrast, the development of stock markets is strongly associated with extensive disclosure requirements and a relatively low burden of proof on investors seeking to recover damages resulting from omissions of material information from the prospectus.
In the remainder of this section, we explore these preliminary findings from a range of perspectives. We first examine whether the weakness of public enforcement is due to our aggregation procedure. Table IV presents the results of regressing external market capitalization on the components of the public enforcement index. The power to make rules is the only element of public enforcement that is statistically significant. The results using other proxies for stock market development are similar (we do not report them to save space). First, neither the characteristics of the Supervisor (i.e., its independence and focus) nor its power to make rules matter for any of the other outcome variables. Second, the Supervisor=s investigative power is only associated with more domestic firms. Third, the Supervisor=s power to issue orders is only associated with more IPOs (and weakly B t-stat of 1.65B with more domestic firms). Fourth, criminal sanctions only matter for IPOs.
Criminal deterrence may be ineffective because proving criminal intent of directors, distributors, or accountants in omitting information from the prospectus is difficult. In sum, no dimension of public enforcement consistently matters for the development of stock markets. Table V presents the results of a horse race between disclosure requirements, liability rules, and public enforcement. Disclosure is significant in all regressions. In contrast, public enforcement is never significant. Liability standards are significant in the regressions for external capitalization, access to equity, and liquidity. However, multicollinearity between disclosure and liability standards may be of concern as the correlation between the two variables is 0.55 (the correlation between public enforcement and either disclosure or liability standards is only around .3). Finally, consistent with Table III , the anti-director rights index is never significant.
One of our key results is that disclosure and liability standards are stronger than the antidirector rights index. The question is why? One possibility is that we have found the "true" channel through which legal origin matters: it is correlated with the development of stock markets because it is a proxy for the effectiveness of private contracting as supported by securities laws.
Note in this regard that legal origin typically looses its strong predictive power for the development of stock markets when we include anti-directors rights, disclosure, or liability standards in the regression. A second possibility is that investor protection through corporate law (which also works through private litigation) also matters, but we simply have cleaner measures of disclosure and liability standards. A third, more nuanced, possibility is that corporate and securities laws often rely on similar rules (e.g., regarding liability standards in civil cases), and it is the presence of these rules that is essential for the ability of private investors to seek remedy for expropriation by corporate insiders. For example, the U.S. system of mandatory disclosure evolved out of common law principles applicable to agents dealing adversely with their principals (Mahoney 1995). In fact, the correlations of anti-director index with disclosure requirements and liability standards are 0.52 and 0.50, respectively (see Appendix). On this view as well, our results do not imply that corporate law is unimportant.
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V. Robustness
In this section, we address three issues of robustness using some additional data. First, is the weakness of our results on public enforcement due to inadequate measures of Supervisor's strength?
Second, what omitted variables may explain the strength of our results on disclosure and liability standards? Third, are securities laws endogenous?
Public enforcement may only be effective in countries with efficient government bureaucracies. To address this concern, we have rerun our regressions for the sub-sample of countries with per capita GDP above the median. We find that in these countries public enforcement is correlated with more developed financial markets as proxied by the market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio, the number of listed firms, and the value of IPOs (and weakly -t-stat of 1.72-with stock market liquidity). 11 The effect of public enforcement in rich countries is narrowly confined to the rule-making power of the Supervisor. In contrast, public enforcement does not predict the development of securities markets in countries with below-median GDP per capita.
A related concern is that public enforcement may be ineffective if the Supervisor lacks adequate resources. To address this concern, we have collected data on the number of employees that work for the Supervisor. We find that the (log of) the number of employees is insignificant in our regressions. To get at the interaction between public enforcement and the resources of the Supervisor, we break the sample according to whether the number of employees working for the Supervisor is above or below the sample median and run separate regressions for both groups of countries. Public enforcement is statistically significant only for IPOs in countries with well-staffed 11 Results are qualitatively similar if we break the sample using survey measures of the quality of government (including either judicial efficiency or Kaufmann et al. (2003) proxy for bureaucratic quality). We also find that public enforcement is correlated with better access to equity markets in countries where insider trading laws were enforced before 1995 (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002).
regulators (and for domestic firms in countries with poorly-staffed ones). All the evidence suggests that relying on pubic enforcement is unlikely to be a useful strategy for jumpstarting the development of securities markets in poor countries.
One set of omitted variable stories holds that investor protection picks up the effect of political ideology. Roe (2000) Another omitted variable story holds that countries with large capital markets may come to rely on disclosure and private litigation because their institutions are more democratically responsive to the interests of small investors. However, measures of democracy and political rights are uncorrelated with securities laws. Moreover, these measures are not significant predictors of financial development in our regressions. A related concern is that securities laws may proxy for social capital. The most commonly used measure of social capital --a survey measure of trust among strangers --is available for 27 of our countries and is always insignificant.
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Finally, it is possible that governments adopt better securities laws in countries with buoyant financial markets (Cheffins 2001 , 2003 , Coffee 2001 . This argument is undermined by the systematic differences in investor protection across legal origins. Reverse causality is also undermined by the fact that the dimensions of the law that are expensive to implement B for example, having an independent and focused regulator B do not seem to matter. On the contrary, what matters is legal rules that are cheap rather than expensive to introduce. A second reverse causality argument holds that regulators swarm toward large securities markets, because there are bigger rents to secure from regulating them. This argument is also undermined by the fact that it is precisely the regulations that render the regulators unimportant, namely those that facilitate private contracting, that have the tightest association with stock market development.
We can partially address endogeneity problems using instrumental variables. In practice, legal origin is the only suitable instrument, but we have several legal variables that influence stock market development. To get around this problem, we replace disclosure, liability standards, and 12 We also used the percentage of the population that belongs to a protestant denomination as a proxy for trust (the correlation between the two variables is 0.762). In the specifications that include our three indices of securities laws, the percentage of population that is protestant predicts more access to equity and a lower control premium but disclosure and liability standards retain their predictive power.
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anti-director rights with the principal component of these three variables, which we call investor protection. This principal component accounts for roughly 70% of the variation in disclosure, liability standards, and anti-director rights. 
VI. Conclusion.
In the introduction, we described three hypotheses concerning the effect of securities laws on stock market development. Our findings provide clear evidence bearing on these hypotheses.
First, the answer to the question of whether Alaw matters@ is a definite yes. Financial markets do not prosper when left to market forces alone. Second, our findings suggest that securities laws matter because they facilitate private contracting rather than provide for public regulatory enforcement. Specifically, we find that several aspects of public enforcement, such as having an independent and/or focused regulator or criminal sanctions, do not matter, and others matter in only some regressions. In contrast, both extensive disclosure requirements and standards of liability facilitating investor recovery of losses are associated with larger stock markets. Our results on the benefits of disclosure support similar findings of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003), who find that their proxy for "private monitoring" is positively correlated with the size of the banking sector. 13 The F-statistic for the exclusion of English legal origin from the first-stage regression is 33.3 suggesting that there is no problem of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock 1997). The Hausman test rejects the unbiasedness of the OLS estimated coefficients in the regressions for domestic firms, IPOs, and trading.
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These results point to the importance of regulating the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors to further the development of capital markets. They also point to the need for legal reform to support financial development, and cast doubt on the sufficiency of purely private solutions in bridging the gap between countries with strong and weak investor protection. Finally, our findings further clarify why legal origin predicts stock market development.
The results support the view that the benefit of common law in this area comes from its emphasis on market discipline and private litigation. The benefits of common law appear to lie in its emphasis on private contracting and standardized disclosure, and in its reliance on private dispute resolution using market-friendly standards of liability.
Table I -Description of the Variables
This table describes the variables in the paper. The Supervisor is the main government agency in charge of supervising stock exchanges. The Issuer is a domestic corporation that raises capital through an initial public offering of common shares. The newlyissued shares will be listed on the country=s largest stock exchange. The Distributor advises the Issuer on the preparation of the prospectus and assists in marketing the securities but does not authorize (or sign) the prospectus unless required by law. The Accountant audits the financial statements and documents that accompany the prospectus. Unless otherwise specified, the source for the variables is the questionnaire of law firms and the laws of each country. The edited answers to the questionnaire are posted at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/securities_documentation.pdf.
Variable Description
I. Disclosure requirements Prospectus
Equals one if the law prohibits selling securities that are going to be listed on the largest stock exchange of the country without delivering a prospectus to potential investors; equals zero otherwise. Compensation An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of directors and key officers. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the compensation of each director and key officer be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; equals one-half if only the aggregate compensation of directors and key officers must be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; equals zero when there is no requirement to disclose the compensation of directors and key officers in the prospectus for a newly-listed firm.
Shareholders
An index of disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer=s equity ownership structure. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require disclosing the name and ownership stake of each shareholder who, directly or indirectly, controls ten percent or more of the Issuer=s voting securities; equals one-half if reporting requirements for the Issuer=s 10% shareholders do not include indirect ownership or if only their aggregate ownership needs to be disclosed; equals zero when the law does not require disclosing the name and ownership stake of the Issuer=s 10% shareholders. No distinction is drawn between large-shareholder reporting requirements imposed on firms and those imposed on large shareholders themselves.
Inside ownership
An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity ownership of the Issuer=s shares by its directors and key officers. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the ownership of the Issuer=s shares by each of its director and key officers be disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-half if only the aggregate number of the Issuer=s shares owned by its directors and key officers must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero when the ownership of Issuer=s shares by its directors and key officers need not be disclosed in the prospectus.
Irregular contracts
An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer=s contracts outside the ordinary course of business. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the terms of material contracts made by the Issuer outside the ordinary course of its business be disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-half if the terms of only some material contracts made outside the ordinary course of business must be disclosed; equals zero otherwise. Transactions An index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transaction between the Issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., Arelated parties@). Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that all transactions in which related parties have, or will have, an interest be disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-half if only some transactions between the Issuer and related parties must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero if transactions between the Issuer and related parties need not be disclosed in the prospectus. Disclosure requirements index
The index of disclosure equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Prospect; (2) Compensation; (3) Shareholders; (4) Inside ownership; (5) Contracts Irregular; (6) and Transactions.
II. Liability standard Liability standard for the issuer and its directors
Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the Issuer and its directors in a civil liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus. We first code separately the liability standard applicable to issuers and its directors and then average the two of them. The liability standard applicable to directors of the issuer equals one when investors are only required to prove that the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two-thirds when investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading statement. Equals one-third when investors must also prove that the director acted with negligence. Equals zero if restitution from directors is either unavailable or the liability standard is intent or gross negligence. The liability standard applicable to issuers is coded analogously.
Liability standard for distributors
Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the Distributor in a civil liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus. Equals one when investors are only required to prove that the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two-thirds when investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading statement. Equals one-third when investors must also prove that the Distributor acted with negligence. Equals zero if restitution from the Distributor is either unavailable or the liability standard is intent or gross negligence. Liability standard for accountants Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the Accountant in a civil liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the audited financial information accompanying the prospectus. Equals one when investors are only required to prove that the audited financial information accompanying the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two-thirds when investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading accounting information. Equals one-third when investors must also prove that the Accountant acted with negligence. Equals zero if restitution from the Accountant is either unavailable or the liability standard is intent or gross negligence.
Liability standard index
The index of liability standards equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Liability standard for the issuer and its directors; (2) Liability standard for the distributor; and (3) Liability standard for the accountant. The index of characteristics of the Supervisor equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Appointment; (2) Tenure; and (3) Focus.
III.1 Characteristics of the Supervisor of Securities Markets
III.2 Power of the Supervisor to issue rules
Rule-making power Index
An index of the power of the Supervisor to issue regulations regarding primary offerings and listing rules on stock exchanges. Equals one if the Supervisor can generally issue regulations regarding primary offerings and/or listing rules on stock exchanges without prior approval of other governmental authorities. Equals onehalf if the Supervisor can generally issue regulations regarding primary offerings and/or listing rules on stock exchanges only with the prior approval of other governmental authorities. Equals zero otherwise.
III.3 Investigative Powers of the Supervisor of Securities Markets
Document
An index of the power of the Supervisor to command documents when investigating a violation of securities laws. Equals one if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative order commanding all persons to turn over documents; equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative order commanding publicly-traded corporations and/or their directors to turn over documents; equals zero otherwise. Witness An index of the power of the Supervisor to subpoena the testimony of witnesses when investigating a violation of securities laws. Equals one if the Supervisor can generally subpoena all persons to give testimony; equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally subpoena the directors of publicly-traded corporations to give testimony; equals zero otherwise.
Investigative powers index
The index of investigative powers equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Document; and (2) Witness.
III.4 Sanctions
Orders issuer
An index aggregating stop and do orders that may be directed to the Issuer in case of a defective prospectus. The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes of orders to stop and to do. The sub-index of orders to stop equals one if the Issuer may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of actions; equals one-half if the Issuer may only be ordered to desist from limited actions; equals zero otherwise. The sub-index of orders to do equals one if the Issuer may be ordered to perform a broad range of actions to rectify the violation; equals one-half if the Issuer may only be ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero otherwise. We disregard orders that may be issued by Courts at the request of a private party in a civil lawsuit.
Orders distributor An index aggregating stop and do orders that may be directed to the Distributor in case of a defective prospectus. The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes of orders to stop and to do. The sub-index of orders to stop equals one if the Distributor may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of actions; equals one-half if the Distributor may only be ordered to desist from limited actions; equals zero otherwise. The subindex of orders to do equals one if the Distributor may be ordered to perform a broad range of actions to rectify the violation; equals one-half if the Distributor may only be ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero otherwise. We disregard orders that may be issued by Courts at the request of a private party in a civil lawsuit.
Orders accountant An index aggregating stop and do orders that may be directed to the Accountant in case of a defective prospectus. The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes of orders to stop and to do. The sub-index of orders to stop equals one if the Accountant may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of actions; equals one-half if the Accountant may only be ordered to desist from limited actions; equals zero otherwise. The sub-index of orders to do equals one if the Accountant may be ordered to perform a broad range of actions to rectify the violation; equals one-half if the Accountant may only be ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero otherwise. We disregard orders that may be issued by Courts at the request of a private party in a civil lawsuit.
Orders index
The index of orders equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Orders issuer; (2) Orders distributor; and (3) Orders accountant. Criminal director/officer An index of criminal sanctions applicable to the Issuer=s directors and key officers when the prospectus omits material information. We create separate sub-indexes for directors and key officers and average their scores. The sub-index for directors equals zero when directors cannot be held criminally liable when the prospectus is misleading. Equals one-half if directors can be held criminally liable when aware that the prospectus is misleading. Equals one if directors can also be held criminally liable when negligently unaware that the prospectus is misleading. The sub-index for key officers is constructed analogously.
Criminal distributor
An index of criminal sanctions applicable to the Distributor (or its officers) when the prospectus omits material information. Equals zero if the Distributor cannot be held criminally liable when the prospectus is misleading. Equals one-half if the Distributor can be held criminally liable when aware that the prospectus is misleading. Equals one if the Distributor can also be held criminally liable when negligently unaware that the prospectus is misleading.
Criminal accountant An index of criminal sanctions applicable to the Accountant (or its officers) when the financial statements accompanying the prospectus omit material information. Equals zero if the Accountant cannot be held criminally liable when the financial statements accompanying the prospectus are misleading. Equals one-half if the Accountant can be held criminally liable when aware that the financial statements accompanying the prospectus are misleading. Equals one if the Accountant can also be held criminally liable when negligently unaware that the financial statements accompanying the prospectus are misleading.
Criminal index
The index of criminal sanctions equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Criminal director; (2) Criminal distributor; and (3) Criminal accountant.
III.5 Summary Index of Public Enforcement Public enforcement index
The index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor characteristics index; (2) Rulemaking power index; (3) Investigative powers index; (4) Orders index; and (5) Criminal index.
IV. Outcome Variables
External cap / GDP Average of the ratio of stock market capitalization held by small shareholders to gross domestic product for the period 1996-2000. The stock market capitalization held by small shareholders is computed as the product of the aggregate stock market capitalization and the average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country. A firm is considered privately-owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it. Source: La Porta et al. (1999) , Hartland-Peel (1996) for Kenya, Bloomberg and various annual reports for Ecuador, Jordan, and Uruguay. Domestic firms / pop Logarithm of the average ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (in millions) for the period 1996-2000. Source: International Finance Corporation: Emerging Markets Database (2001) and World Bank (2001) .
IPOs
Average of the ratio of the equity issued by newly-listed firms in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions) over the period 1996 -2000 . Source: Securities Data Corporation, World Bank (2001 .
Block premia
AThe block premia is computed taking the difference between the price per share paid for the control block and the exchange price two days after the announcement of the control transaction, dividing by the exchange price and multiplying by the ratio of the proportion of cash flow rights represented in the controlling block.@ We use the country=s sample media. Source: Dyck and Zingales (2004) . Access to equity Index of the extent to which business executives in a country agree with the statement AStock markets are open to new firms and medium-sized firms@. Scale from 1 (strongly agree) though 7 (strongly disagree). Source: Schwab et al. (1999) .
Ownership Concentration
Average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country. A firm is considered privately-owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it. Source: La Porta et al. (1999) , Hartland-Peel (1996) for Kenya, Bloomberg and various annual reports for Ecuador, Jordan, and Uruguay. Liquidity Average of the total value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP for the period 1996-2000. Source: World Development Indicators at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/.
V. Control Variables and Instruments
Anti-director rights This index of Anti-director rights is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders= Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders= Meeting is less than or equal to ten percent (the sample median); or (6) when shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders meeting. The range for the index is from zero to six. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) . Efficiency of the judiciary Assessment of the Aefficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms@ produced by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). It may be Ataken to represent investors= assessment of conditions in the country in question.@ Average between 1980 and 1983. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores representing lower efficiency levels. Source: International Country Risk Guide. Log GDP per capita Logarithmic of per capita Gross Domestic Product (in US dollars) in 2000.
Legal Origin
Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country. Source: La Porta, et al. (1999) . Investor Protection Principal component of disclosure, liability standards, and Anti-director rights. Scale from 0 to 10. This table classifies countries by legal origin and shows the securities law variables for each country covering the areas of: (1) Disclosure requirements; (2) Liability standards; (3) Supervisor characteristics; (4) Rulemaking power of the supervisor; (5) Investigative powers of the supervisor; (6) Orders to issuers, distributors, and accountants; (7) Criminal sanctions applicable to directors, distributors, and accountants; and (8) Public enforcement. All variables are described in Table I 
Table II --Indices of Regulation of Securities Markets
Tests of means (t-stats)
Note: a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; and c significant at 10% Table III -Securities Laws and the development of stock markets Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross-section of countries. The dependent variables are: (1) External market capitalization; (2) Log of domestic firms per capita; (3) Value of IPOs; (4) Block premium; (5) Access to equity; (6) Ownership concentration; and (7) the Stock-market-volume-to-GDP ratio. All regressions include Anti-director rights, Efficiency of the judiciary, and Log of GDP per capita. In addition, regressions include Disclosure requirements (Panel A); Liability standards (Panel B); and Public enforcement (Panel C). All variables are described in Table I (7) the Stock-market-volume-to-GDP ratio. Investor protection is the principal component of: (1) Anti-director rights; (2) Disclosure; and (3) Liability standards. In addition to Investor protection, all regressions include Efficiency of the judiciary and Log of GDP per capita. Panel B presents results from the first-stage regression. The instrument is a dummy equal to one if the country's legal origin is common law. All variables are described in Table I Table II lists the country codes.
Appendix --Table of Correlations
This appendix shows the correlations among the variables used in the paper. All variables are described in Table I 
